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Thinking Outside the Little Boxes:
A Response to Professor Schlunk
David A. Weisbach*
Herwig Schlunk, in his article, "Little Boxes: Can Optimal Commodity
Tax Methodology Save the Debt-Equity Distinction,"' addresses a problem
that I think is key to much tax policymaking. The problem, which goes well
beyond the debt-equity distinction, is that policymakers are frequently forced
to draw lines between essentially similar things, treating them differently for
tax purposes. Debt and equity are fundamentally similar methods of finan-
cing a business yet are treated differently for tax purposes. Independent
contractors and employees are both service providers but are taxed
differently. Imputed returns from services and market-purchased services
can be very similar but are taxed differently. This line-drawing problem
pervades tax policymaking.
Schlunk focuses on what he calls the "optimal commodity tax
methodology" for drawing lines such as these.2 The optimal commodity tax
methodology provides some specific rules of thumb for line drawing based
on a particular model of the problem. This methodology, however, is part of
a much more general family of theses.3 At its most general level, the thesis is
that if we must distinguish between two activities, we should do so in a way
that maximizes welfare. The point is that we should not focus on traditional
"tax policy" theories, such as the definition of income, horizontal equity,
notions of platonic forms of things like debt or equity, or any other nonsense
that does not focus directly on outcomes.
A slightly more specific thesis is that lines should be drawn to minimize
the deadweight loss from the distinction at issue. That is, the focus of line
drawing, with some exceptions, should be on the efficiency effects of
distinctions rather than the more general welfare effects.
. Professor, The University of Chicago Law School. I thank Mark Gergen, Calvin Johnson,
and Herwig Schlunk for comments.
1. Herwig J. Schlunk, Little Boxes: Can Optimal Conunodiy Tax Methodology Save the Debt-
Equity Distinction, 80 TEXAS L. REv. 859 (2002).
2. Id at 860.
3. For a general statement, see David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing. Doctrine, and Efficiency in
the Tax Law, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1627 (1999), and for a more specific model, see David A.
Weisbach, An Efficiency Analysis of Line Drawing in the Tar Law, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 71 (2000)
[hereinafter Weisbach, An Efficiency Analysis]. For examples of similar analysis, also see Daniel N.
Shaviro, An Efficiency Analysis of Realization and Recognition Rules Under the Federal Income
Tax, 48 TAX L. REV. 1 (1992), Mark P. Gergen & Paula Schmitz, The Influence of Tar Law, on
Securities Innovation, 52 TAX L. REV. 119 (1997), and David A. Weisbach, Should a Short Sale
Against the Box Be a Realization Event?, 50 NAT'LTAXJ. 495 (1997).
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The most narrow thesis is that line-drawing problems have a common
structure and, therefore, are susceptible to similar solutions. One of the items
is inevitably taxed at a higher rate than the other. Taxpayers have an in-
centive to shift to the low-taxed item and such shifting produces deadweight
loss.4 The degree of taxpayer shifting is related to the compensated cross-
elasticities of demand for the two items. Using standard formulas for
deadweight loss that key into these elasticities, we can model the choice and
solve for the decision that minimizes deadweight loss. At this level, the
theory provides a general approach for solving line-drawing problems and
ties together areas of law that might previously have seemed quite distinct.
The debt-equity problem looks much like the independent
contractor/employee problem which looks like the realization/nonrealization
problem.
The thrust of Schlunk's argument is that lines in the tax law should be
eliminated where possible.5 The debt-equity line-the main example in his
article-seems senseless to most observers and probably should be
eliminated. Even the most enlightened line drawing cannot solve the central
problem with the distinction. The same can be said for numerous other tax-
law lines, such as the distinction between capital gains and ordinary income
or the distinction between partnerships and corporations. Schlunk's push to
eliminate lines in the tax law is surely right, and line-drawing theses at any of
the levels described above do not suggest otherwise. We should always be
mindful that good line drawing is a band-aid that does not eliminate the
deadweight loss from discontinuities in the tax law. The most beautiful line-
drawing edifice cannot stand for long on a rickety foundation.
In making this general argument for the elimination of lines in the tax
law, however, Schlunk also makes more specific criticisms of line-drawing
theories. In particular, Schlunk argues that optimal line drawing leads to
path-dependent results.6  Suppose the world starts out with a few
commodities and lines are drawn. When new commodities are discovered,
their classification will depend on the lines drawn in the first period. When
even newer commodities are discovered, their treatment depends on the prior
periods' decisions, and so forth. The treatment of the various commodities
would be different if the order of introduction had been reversed. He
concludes that "[i]f the existing items are themselves inconsistently taxed,
the inquiry can only lead to ex post arbitrary tax results and/or to
discontinuities. At the end of the day, the most robust approach is simply to
eliminate the inconsistent tax treatment of the existing items." 7 Therefore, he
says (later in the article), "[i]t makes no sense to add incrementally to the
4. Schlunk, supra note 1, at 860.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 861-62.
7. Id. at 861.
(Vol. 80:893
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learning on the debt-equity distinction [his example of line drawing], whether
by means of optimal commodity tax methodology or otherwise."
S
Schlunk's specific criticisms of line drawing are overly broad and often
miss the mark. In this comment, I explain why that is so. Part I examines his
general conclusions. Part 1I examines his specific claim that the optimal
commodity tax method of line drawing is path-dependent and, therefore,
arbitrary. Part III examines his discussion of hybridization, with particular
reference to the debt-equity distinction.
I. Schlunk's General Conclusions
As discussed above, Schlunk believes that the most robust approach to
distinctions in the tax law is to eliminate them. Schlunk is advocating a tax
law that does not distinguish between similar items. That is, Schlunk is
calling for broad tax reform. Schlunk is surely correct that the most robust
approach to bad lines in the tax law is to eliminate them. As a general
proposition, rather than be stuck drawing "little boxes" in the world of line
drawing, we should always be mindful of the possibility of broader reform.
The possibility of tax reform, however, has little to do with the line-
drawing problem, at least as conceived in the existing literature. The argu-
ments about line drawing do not say that we should not adopt broad tax
reforms if these reforms are available. For example, there is nothing in the
existing literature to say that elimination of the debt-equity distinction is not
better than trying to maintain the distinction through difficult lines.
The focus of the line-drawing arguments is on a different question. The
assumption is that the policymaker faces a limited set of choices and must
draw a line. This focus is intended to address the daily issues faced by a
policymaker. My personal interest in line drawing grew out of frustration
with determining whether the regular pronouncements coming out of the
Treasury Department or Congress made sense. Were the check-the-box
regulations a good idea? Should a short-against-the-box be a realization
event? Is MIPS debt or equity? Should the Morris Trust decision9 be
repealed? The policymakers making these decisions could not avoid these
decisions by proposing tax reform. Tax reform is very important, but these
questions are the daily fare of tax policymaking, and we should have a theory
for thinking about them.
More important, the line-drawing problem will persist even under the
broadest reforms. Every tax system draws lines, such as the differences
between consumption and investment, imputed and non-imputed returns,
8. Id. at 890.
9. Comm'r v. Morris Trust, 367 F.2d 794 (4th Cir. 1966). This decision was repealed by I.R.C.
§ 355(e), which was part of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997.
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barter and cash, and taxpaying units and units not subject to tax. Arguments
for tax reform cannot solve the line-drawing problem.
Finally, suppose Schlunk's specific criticisms of the optimal commodity
tax method of line drawing are correct. For example, suppose that it is
arbitrary. Schlunk argues that his criticisms show that it does not make sense
to add to the learning about drawing lines. The conclusion, however, should
be the opposite. We would need more, rather than less, study of the line-
drawing problem, because his criticisms would mean that we do not yet
understand the problem.
II. Path-Dependence
A. Limited Power of Policymakers
As noted in Part I, the focus in the line-drawing literature is on the
typical position of a senior policymaker, such as the Secretary of the
Treasury or the Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee. These senior
policymakers have considerable flexibility but are subject to a variety of
constraints. In particular, they almost always have to take the basic outline
of current law as given. While their limitations will vary with the context,
they cannot generally make broad reforms, such as eliminating the corporate
tax or the realization requirement. Moreover, most of the time, their freedom
of action is substantially constrained-their choices are far more limited than
simply not making broad reforms. Instead, they can only make incremental
decisions. Policymakers may feel limited by this situation, preferring
complete freedom to make policy, but they are stuck and want to make the
best decisions given the circumstances.
Consider some recent examples of this limited ability of policymakers
to make changes. Partnerships and corporations are taxed differently. In re-
cent years, there has not been an option to tax them the same way. The
Treasury Department, which could not conceivably decide to eliminate the
distinction between partnerships and corporations, had to decide how to
differentiate between them. Another recent example is tax treatment of a
short-against-the-box transaction. A short-against-the-box transaction looks
much like a realization event. The policymakers (Congress this time) did not
have the option of eliminating the realization requirement but, instead, had to
decide whether to classify shorts-against-the-box as a realization event. Debt
and equity are fundamentally similar. Policymakers have been faced with a
wide variety of financial instruments that push the line between them in one
direction or another. As much as the policymakers may pine for the
elimination of the debt-equity distinction, they had to respond to these
various instruments (including by not doing anything). The number of ex-
amples fitting this pattern of incremental decisionmaking is nearly infinite.
These are the problems policymakers routinely face. The question these
problems raise is how should a person decide in these circumstances
[Vol. 80:893
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(keeping in mind that a person must decide, because not doing anything is a
decision).
B. Line-Drawing Theory
Line-drawing theory attempts to provide some rules of thumb for
determining the consequences of decisions like these. The key observation
of line-drawing theory is that many of these decisions look fundamentally the
same, so a general theory can apply. In particular, in all these questions, two
or more tax treatments potentially apply. One of these treatments will
impose a higher tax than the other. Policymakers do not have the option of
changing these core tax regimes. The policymaker may, however, change
the dividing line between the regimes to a limited extent. Taxpayers will
respond to any dividing line by shifting their behavior toward the lower-
taxed regime. This shifting of behavior causes efficiency losses-taxpayers
might prefer to do one thing but end up doing another because of the
perverse tax incentives. The goal of line-drawing theory is to understand
how to differentiate the regimes so as to minimize the efficiency losses from
this unhappy situation.
This is where differential commodity taxes come in. There are a variety
of "off-the-shelf' models that consider the efficiency-maximizing set of taxes
on commodities. In all of these models, the tax on at least one commodity is
fixed at zero, and there is a budget constraint so that the government must
have non-zero taxes on some of the other commodities. The non-zero taxes
will cause individuals to shift their behavior, leading to efficiency losses.' 0
Because of the assumption of a fixed, zero tax on one item, the optimal tax
structure is not a level tax on all commodities. Instead, we adjust the
structure to minimize the effect of shifting to the zero-taxed item. Loosely,
we lower the tax on substitutes for the non-taxed item and raise the tax on
complements to the non-taxed item. This tax structure results in the
differential taxation familiar to many in simplified form as Ramsey taxation.
The line-drawing model looks much like the above tax structure, but
there are two fixed items with different tax rates. We must tax a third item at
the same rate as one of these two, and adjust overall tax rates to stay within
the budget constraint. The resulting intuitions are quite similar to the
intuitions in the more general commodity tax case. We care about
10. This description of the economics is quite loose. We can rigorously dcefine how (and
which) behavior shifts cause efficiency losses. A heuristic but more accurate description can be
found in Weisbach, An Efficiency Analysis of Line Drawing in the Tax Lmv, supra note 3.
Mathematical versions can be found in many places, including Alan J. Auerbach, The Theory of
Excess Burden and Optimal Taxation, in 1 HANDBOOK OF PUBIc EcoNoMics 61 (Alan J.
Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 1985).
11. See W. J. Corlett & D.C. Hague, Coiplenentarity and the Ercess Burden of Taration, 21
REV. ECON. STUD. 21 (1953).
2002]
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substitution effects and want to classify items to minimize the costs from
shifting across the boundary.
C. The Alleged Path-Dependence of Line Drawing
An important fact about the line-drawing problem is that the answer
depends on the initial constraints. If the fixed points change, the answer
changes. One can readily see this in the above model, where the
mathematical formula refers to the fixed points for its solution. But this facet
of the line-drawing problem is not an artifact of the above model. Instead,
policymakers in the real world will often make different decisions when their
degrees of freedom change.
Schlunk's path-dependence claim boils down to this fact. The answer
one gets depends on the options one is given. Schlunk shows path-
dependence by serially changing the fixed points. We start with an initial set
of fixed points and make decisions based on those fixed points. Schlunk then
prohibits revisiting those decisions, so they become new fixed points. New
questions and new answers arrive, and these answers are then fixed. And the
process continues. If the initial fixed points or the sequence of questions had
been different, the decisions at various points in time would have been
different. These different decisions would have been fixed in stone, and the
subsequent answers would be different. Schlunk shows this with an ex-
tended mathematical example.12  But the core idea is simple: if we are
prohibited from revisiting old decisions when new problems arise, we get
path-dependence. Schlunk then argues that this means that the line-drawing
theories should be discarded in exchange for efforts to eliminate
distinctions.1
3
I discussed above the reasons why line-drawing theories (whether this
one or another one) cannot be discarded. Here, I will explore the strength of
the path-dependence claim. I have three points. First, the path-dependence
argument is not really about the commodity tax theory of line drawing. Any
theory of making decisions, line-drawing decisions or not, tax or not, where
decisions are fixed in stone is subject to exactly the same criticism.
For example, the path-dependence argument applies to the tax reforms
Schlunk calls for as an antidote for line-drawing problems. Schlunk would
enact a neutral system for corporate capital that would tax all capital at the
nominal corporate rate by eliminating the debt-equity distinction. 4 This
neutral system is probably a good idea. Suppose we decide to enact
Schlunk's neutral system and fix the system in stone. Suppose further that
12. Schlunk, supra note 1, at 862-73.
13. Id. at 887-91.
14. See generally Herwig J. Schlunk, The Zen of Corporate Capital Structure Neutrality, 99
MICH. L. REV. 410 (2000).
[Vol. 80:893
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the next day we decide to switch to a consumption tax and not tax capital at
all. The initial decision, however, cannot be changed under our assumptions,
so all we can do is exempt non-corporate capital. This exemption would
probably be a bad idea because it would worsen the distinction between
corporate and non-corporate capital. Had we not first fixed the corporate tax,
we would be able to make better decisions about the consumption tax. The
decision to fix the corporate tax, under this analysis, leads to path-dependent
results and, therefore, is as arbitrary as the line-drawing theory. This bizarre
result is a consequence of Schlunk's assumption that we cannot revisit past
decisions.
Schlunk might have argued, but he did not, that there is something
special about the line-drawing approach that makes us less likely to revisit
past mistakes. Therefore, we are justified in holding the line-drawing theory,
but not other theories, to this high standard. I do not think such an argument
could be supported, however. The line-drawing regime considers how best
to make decisions given the constraints on the policymaker but says nothing
about what those constraints might be. If the constraints are loosened, the
decision changes. There is no reason to impose tighter constraints on
policymakers in the line-drawing context than anywhere else.
Second, failure to revisit is not more likely or more important in the tax
law (generally as opposed to just in line drawing) than in other areas.
Schiunk's model completely prohibits reversals of prior decisions. But this
prohibition is probably just a simplifying assumption for heuristic purposes
rather than a claim that we never reverse past decisions. We reverse past
decisions in the tax law all the time.' 5 But the strong claim of arbitrariness
relies on this artifact of modeling. To the extent we revisit past decisions, the
arbitrariness is reduced or eliminated. The question raised is whether we
should be more concerned about failure to revisit decisions in the tax law
than in other areas.
Path-dependence claims typically rely on increasing returns to scale or
network externalities. The classic, although disputed, claim of path-
dependence is the QWERTY keyboard.16 The claim is that the QWERTY
typewriter keyboard was initially adopted to slow down typing because keys
15. Consider a few examples from the business-tax world. The corporate tax was governed by
the General Utilities doctrine until 1986, when it was repealed. Losses could be transferred, but
then Congress enacted § 382 to restrict this. Morris Trust governed the treatment of spin-offs
followed by a tax-free acquisition, but was subsequently repealed. Bausch and Lomb limited the
availability of C reorganizations, but has been overturned. The continuity-of-interest rules have
been overhauled. The consolidated-return rules were almost completely rewritten. Shorts-against-
the-box were not realization events, and now they are. Original-issue discount was accrued on a
straight-line basis, and now it is accrued on a constant-yield basis. The list is endless. For a more
detailed discussion of many of these examples, see generally WVeisbach, An Efficiency Analysis,
supra note 3.
16. See Paul David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 A1. ECON. REV. 332 (1985); SJ.
Liebowitz & Stephen Margolis, The Fable of the Keys, 33 J. LAW, & ECON. 1 (1990).
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would get stuck on old manual typewriters if the typing was too fast. Once a
large number of people had learned to type using this keyboard, it became
too costly to change it even though there is no longer a problem with keys
jamming. Worse, the costs of switching to a superior keyboard, the Dvorak
keyboard, are claimed to be relatively low (the costs are said to be recovered
in about ten days) but path-dependence prevents the change. We are left
with an inefficient keyboard. Similar stories are told about the Beta video
recording system and the Apple Macintosh operating system. 
17
These path-dependence claims are all controversial. The historical basis
for the claims has been challenged. For example, it is not clear that Beta was
superior to VHS or that the Dvorak keyboard was superior to the QWERTY
keyboard. In addition, the path-dependence claims require early adopters to
choose the inferior technology notwithstanding that another technology
yields greater payoffs. The claims also require a failure to switch to the
superior technology once information about its superiority is known. The
assumptions needed to produce these results are highly restrictive.
18
Schlunk does not claim his path-dependence argument is based on
increasing returns to scale; therefore, it must be based on something else.
One possible argument is that legal rules tend to be path-dependent in ways
economic decisions are not because of public-choice problems. The rationale
might be that legal decisions are self-perpetuating because they benefit
particular groups. These benefited groups then become concentrated con-
stituencies, thereby ensuring the decision long life in the public-choice
world. Lucian Bebchuk and Mark Roe make this claim in attempting to
explain why we have not seen convergence in corporate forms around the
world.' 9
A public-choice explanation of path-dependence, however, is likely to
be extremely sensitive to how legal change is achieved. 20 For example, if
legal change offers transition relief to winners under the old law, they may
not object. The public-choice explanation is complicated because the extent
of transition relief also affects incentives for the winners under the new law
to lobby for change (because it affects both how much they gain immediately
from the legal change and how much they will preserve if the law is changed
yet again). While we have yet to sort out this issue completely, it is not at all
obvious that public-choice concerns would make legal rules more path-
dependent than other types of decisions.
17. See Brian Arthur, Positive Feedbacks in the Economy, 262 SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN 92
(1990).
18. For a general discussion of the economics of path-dependence, see S.J. Liebowitz &
Stephen Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-In, and History, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 205 (1995).
19. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership
and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127 (1999); see also Mark Roe, Chaos and Evolution in L.,aw
and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 741 (1996).
20. See Saul Levmore, Anticipations and Reparations, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 1657 (1999).
[Vol. 80:893
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There is nothing to make us think that the tax law is especially
important or unique with respect to revisiting past decisions. Tax law poses
few increasing returns to scale or unique public-choice problems. If
anything, we might guess that tax law revisits more frequently than other
areas of the law. The entire literature on transition relief stemmed from
concerns about changes to tax regimes, perhaps indicating that legal change
is particularly prevalent in the tax law.21 Other scholars have studied the
extraordinary and increasing pace of tax-law changes and tried to explain
these changes in public-choice terms.")
Schlunk's only support for his path-dependence claim is a brief recital
of history in the debt-equity area. This history does not extend to a more
general claim in the tax law. Debt-equity is fairly unique in the tax law, as it
is based on court decisions rather than legislated rules. Court decisions may
differ from legislated rules in their deference to the past. Where legislative
rules have been used in the debt-equity area, they have generally reversed
past decisions.23 Finally, Schlunk's path-dependence story is incomplete. To
show irreversibility, one has to show that it would have been smart to reverse
the decision earlier than it was done given the information and markets at the
time. Schlunk does not even attempt this showing.
We can see the strength of Schlunk's irreversibility assumption in his
footnote 41.24 In the example in the footnote, the government draws a line
that is scaled between zero and 100. Zero and 100 have fixed treatments, and
taxpayers prefer the zero treatment. (The line represents debt and equity, but
this is not particularly relevant.) The government is prohibited from
revisiting past decisions or anticipating future decisions, but taxpayers can
strateoically present problems to the government. The government decision
criterion is to divide the "open space" in half. The taxpayer first sends up the
number 49, which the government classifies with zero because it is closer to
zero than 100. The open space is now only from 50 to 100 because the
decision about 49 and everything lower is fixed forever. The taxpayer next
ponies up 74, which the government classifies with the 0 to 49 category
because the decision criteria looks only to the remaining open space. The
number 74 is less than half way up the remaining space. The next number
would be 87.4, which again is put in the zero box. This process continues so
that eventually only the number 100 is in the 100 class. In Schlunk's
example, the government ends up classifying everything as debt.
21. See Michael Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in Income Tax Revision,
126 U. PA. L. REv. 47 (1977).
22. See Richard L. Doemberg & Fred S. McChesney, On the Accelerating Rate and Decreasing
Durability of Tax Reform, 71 MINN. L. REV. 913 (1987).
23. See Schlunk, supra note 1, at 867 n.15.
24. Id. at 883 n.41.
2002]
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This example looks unrealistic to me. It seems more likely that once it
is apparent that the law is on a path toward putting everything in the zero-tax
box, the government will revisit past decisions. In Schlunk's example, the tax
base is gradually disappearing. The government is unlikely to be able to live
with the reduced tax base for long, at least if it wants to collect revenue from
this source (and if it does not, the example represents a good result rather
than a claim of perverse path-dependence).
Rather than being governed by some unique form of path-dependence,
line-drawing decisions are likely to be subject to the same soil of mundane
durability that all decisions have. We cannot revisit everything every day.
Instead, we can only focus on the most pressing problems, so decisions tend
to be more durable than we might like. Where the problems are pressing, we
revisit. We can see this dynamic in Schlunk's argument that we should revisit
the debt-equity distinction. His claim is precisely that the problem is
pressing and that revisiting it is necessary.
There is a third problem with Schlunk's path-dependence argument.
Suppose there is some degree of path-dependence. That is, suppose that
today's decisions involve sunk costs and that we are unlikely to revisit them
quickly. We would not learn from this path-dependence that minimizing
deadweight loss from decisions is a bad idea or that it is arbitrary. Instead,
we would learn that the policymaker must adjust the decision criteria for the
fact that decisions are sunk. The policymaker would have to be more
forward-looking, but the fundamental analysis would not change.
There is an extensive literature on how to make decisions when some or
all of the costs will be sunk.25 The literature analyzes decisionmaking as the
exercise of an option. Under this analysis, the decision-maker must not only
consider the direct cost of the project but also the loss in flexibility from
giving up the option. The decisionmaking methods in the literature attempt
to price the option and determine the optimal time to incur the sunk costs
given this option.
Consider Schlunk's fruit example.26 If the government knows that a
decision on kiwis will be fixed in stone even though unknown fruits will
surely be developed in the future, it needs to take the loss of flexibility with
regard to kiwis into account when it makes its initial decision. It may very
well defer the decision for some time to see what the future holds.
This is an important point, and if Schlunk is arguing that we must adjust
line-drawing theories for an option element, he may be right, at least to the
extent we believe that past decisions are irreversible. The real world
probably looks a bit like this. Past decisions are not irreversible but there are
25. See generally RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
FINANCE ch. 21 (6th ed. 2000); AvINASH K. DIXIT & ROBERT S. PINDYCK, INVESTMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY (1994).
26. Schlunk, supra note 1, at 862.
[Vol. 80:893
HeinOnline  -- 80 Tex. L. Rev. 902 2001-2002
Thinking Outside the Little Boxes
costs to changing them. There will be some option element in most decision-
making. But this option argument is a more general point about decision
criteria, not a particular point about line drawing. It is also not inconsistent
with prior line-drawing theory. Instead, it shows the importance of having a
line-drawing theory that accounts for contingencies. If we cannot reverse
today's decisions, we had better be sure they are as good as possible.
We can see how finding an option element does not make a decision
arbitrary by considering an analogy. Suppose a developer is thinking about
building a building. Once built, the costs cannot readily be recovered should
the project turn out to have been a mistake. These costs are sunk. Based on
all the information the developer has today, the decision to build seems to
make sense. But it may be the case that at some unknown date in the future,
something will happen causing the developer to regret the decision. For
example, another structure may be built next door that ruins the views. The
developer would not have built the initial building had he known about the
second building.
The choice to put up the first building is path-dependent in exactly the
same way that Schlunk claims the line-drawing theory is. Had the order of
choices been different, the developer would have decided differently. We do
not conclude, however, that the decision criteria used by the developer are
arbitrary. Instead, we say that the decision criteria must take into account the
fact that the future is uncertain. Option theory is an attempt to formalize this.
The same is true with line drawing. Minimizing deadweight loss is not an
arbitrary goal. Instead, if decisions are sunk, we must take this into account
and adjust the particular decision criteria.
D. Conclusion
The path-dependence claim is not really about optimal line drawing.
Instead, the path-dependence claim applies to all decisionmaking to the
extent that decisions cannot be reversed. Nothing about line drawing makes
it better or worse than any other decision criteria in this regard. Path-
dependence, instead, is a much more general problem.
It is not clear the extent to which path-dependence is a special problem
in the tax law. There are few increasing returns to scale and no special
public-choice problems. Where the consequences of path-dependence are
bad, there is a strong incentive to reverse course. Moreover, the costs of
reversing course are likely to be low in tax law compared to, say, changing
network standards. More work remains to be done in this area, but a bald
and virtually unsupported claim of strong irreversibility is insufficient for
drawing conclusions.
Finally, to the extent line drawing is path-dependent, we do not learn
that it is arbitrary. Instead, we learn that we must do our best to anticipate
the future and take into account that decisions are sunk. We can think about
20021
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this using options, but the basic point does not require that level of
sophistication. If we cannot reverse course in the future, we must be more
careful about decisions we make today. But this prudence in decision-
making makes good line-drawing theory more, rather than less, important.
III. Hybrids, Arbitrage, and the Debt-Equity Distinction
Hybrids are two or more items that net to equal a third. For example,
financial instruments can often be held in combinations that replicate other
financial instruments. Much of Schlunk's article is about hybrids. 27 They
appear in two different parts of the article: in an explicit model of
hybridization using fruits, and in the example of the debt-equity distinction.
This Part discusses each of these sections in turn.
A. Schlunk's Fruit Model
Schlunk's conclusions in the hybrid-fruits model are unclear. His claim
seems to be that if hybrids are available, the line-drawing exercise is
indeterminate. Using kiwi fruits as his example of a hybrid, Schlunk states
that optimal commodity tax methodology provides no guidance to the taxing
authority because both taxing kiwis and not taxing kiwis lead to the same
consumption patterns.28
As Schlunk notes, the claim that the commodity tax methodology
provides no guidance in this case is only true if we do not care about how
much revenue the tax raises. All the models in Schlunk's article have this
feature. They ignore revenue. In the hybrid-fruit model, taxing kiwis
produces substantially more revenue than not taxing kiwis with the same
underlying consumption patterns. It is hard to imagine why the choice in this
case wouldn't be clear: the taxing authority should pick the line that gives the
highest revenue because the extra revenue is lump sum. Unless all other
sources of revenue are nondistortive and we have otherwise already
optimally redistributed wealth and purchased public goods, lump-sum
revenue can be used to increase welfare.
It is difficult to understand models that do not hold the budget constraint
fixed.29 If two tax systems raise differing amounts of revenue, comparing
their deadweight losses is not meaningful. The tax that raises more revenue
should be expected to have a higher deadweight loss, and this tax may still be
more desirable. In Schlunk's hybrid-fruit model, a tax that raises more
revenue has the same deadweight loss as the other tax, but Schlunk's model
27. Id. at 873-79, 885-87.
28. Id. at 873.
29. Alternatively, the budget constraint can be made endogenous so that the higher the
deadweight loss from taxation, the lower the budget constraint. For an example, see Louis Kaplow,
Optimal Taxation with Costly Enforcement and Evasion, 43 J. PUB. ECON. 221 (1990).
[Vol. 80:893
HeinOnline  -- 80 Tex. L. Rev. 904 2001-2002
Thinking Outside the Little Boxes
concludes that the higher revenue tax is not preferable. This conclusion only
highlights the oddity of this comparison.
Schlunk justifies this model by arguing that there is generally no
immediate or even long-term direct tax rate response to windfalls or deficits
because of changes to tax rules.30 But in the long run the government is
subject to a budget constraint that cannot be ignored in thinking about taxes.
Otherwise, the prescription based on deadweight-loss measurements would
be to have no taxes at all. This budget constraint is why offsetting tax
changes are and must be observed in practice. We have taxes because the
budget constraint is real. The changes may come as overall rate changes, or
they may come through changes to the tax base. They may also come in
future years, with current-year changes increasing or reducing government
borrowing. But regardless of how offsetting changes are made, the budget
constraint is relevant and cannot be ignored. If budget constraints cannot be
ignored, the results in the hybrids case are not indeterminate.
The conclusions about hybrids are more muddled once we consider the
case with an infinite number of hybrids. In such a case, Schlunk shows how
to compute a unique, non-path-dependent line that minimizes deadweight
loss.3 1 The path dependency disappears because all of the commodities are
introduced at once via hybridization.
The disappearance of path dependency is at odds with the path-
dependency claim from the case without hybrids. If one believes the path-
dependency claim, one must wonder whether Schlunk's hybrids case or the
case without hybrids is more plausible. Here, Schlunk argues that hybrids
are likely to be introduced only over time, 32 and I agree. Even though the
income tax looks at cash flows that can be split up or combined, doing so is
often costly. But note that this high cost also limits concerns about
arbitrage-when splitting up or combining cash flows is costly, various
financial identities that look good on paper are unlikely to be perfect
substitutes in the real world.
B. Debt-Equity Distinction
It is perhaps best, then, to turn away from the hybrid-fruits model and
focus on the example, the debt-equity distinction. Schlunk goes through an
extended example of using betas to distinguish debt from equity.33 Part of
the example attempts to show path-dependence, a result that I have already
commented on.3 Another part of the example focuses on hybridization, the
topic here.
30. See Schlunk, supra note 1, at 877.
31. Ld. at 878.
32. Id. at 879.
33. Id. at 888-90.
34. See discussion supra Part II.
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While the example is quite complicated, it relies on a single core idea:
issuing debt and a swap creates the same economics as issuing equity.
Equity, however, is high-taxed, while the combination of debt and a swap is
low-taxed. Taxpayers have an incentive to replace high-taxed equity with
low-taxed debt-and-swap combinations. At the extreme, equity would
disappear altogether.
The argument underlying this observation is that if two identical items
are taxed differently, people will choose the lower-taxed item.35 Over time,
they will completely switch to the lower-taxed item, with the result that there
is a loss in tax revenues, but no deadweight loss. These results may be true,
but they are not particularly relevant to the line-drawing problem. Even if
we never face a line-drawing problem again and no new exotic hybrid
financial instruments are ever created in the future, we would still end up
with zero tax in this example. Line drawing is not driving the result.
We can see how distinct the argument is from the line-drawing problem
by considering how it applies to other tax theories. If we adopted every tax
reform that every theorist has ever posed but retained Schlunk's assumptions
that the combination of debt and swap is taxed at a zero rate while identical
equity is taxed at some positive rate, we would end up with a zero tax on
corporations. The example is not a criticism of line-drawing theory. It is a
criticism of the taxation of swaps.
One way to see why the example is not about line drawing is to consider
an extreme, if silly, hypothetical. Suppose there were, by mistake, a rule that
if a taxpayer files his return on blue paper instead of the normal white paper,
the taxpayer owes no tax. This is like Schlunk's assumption that if a
taxpayer issues equity through a combination of debt and swap, the taxpayer
owes no tax. Schlunk concludes that, in such a world, the line-drawing
theory does not work.36
The problem with this goofy hypothetical tax system, however, is not
with faulty line-drawing theories. The problem is that filing on blue returns
should not change your tax liability. But Schlunk has assumed that the line-
drawing theory cannot address the "blue return" problem-the "blue return"
rule is fixed for purposes of evaluating the line-drawing theory. If Schlunk
were to make similar assumptions about any theory, it would lead to
similarly faulty results. The most lofty theories of perfect income taxation or
consumption taxation would fail this test. If Schlunk posits a problem that he
35. This observation has also been made numerous times in the context of financial
instruments. See, e.g., Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Financial Contract Innovation and Income Tax Policy,
107 HARV. L. REV. 460 (1993); David A. Weisbach, Colloquium on Financial Instruments: Tax
Responses to Financial Contract Innovation, 50 TAX L. REV. 491 (1995); Jeff Strand, Taxing New
Financial Products: A Conceptual Framework, 46 STAN. L. REV. 569 (1994); Joseph E. Stiglitz,
The General Theory of TaxAvoidance, 38 NAT'LTAxJ. 325 (1985).
36. Schlunk, supra note 1, at 889.
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assumes cannot be fixed, he cannot criticize a theory for failing to fix it.
Moreover, he cannot then offer a solution to fix the problem, effectively
relaxing the constraint on his theory but not on others.
I do not mean to suggest that the "blue tax return" problem is not
important. We must fix this sort of problem, and Schlunk is right to point out
that we should watch out for this sort of thing. But the "blue tax return"
problem is unrelated to the line-drawing problem. Even if we fix the
problem, we need a line-drawing theory. If, under the extreme assumptions
of perfect substitutes, we do not fix it, no tax theory does any good. And
most theories of the tax law, including the line-drawing theory, would
suggest that the problem be fixed.
In the debt-equity model, all hybrids are available at once. It is like the
infinite-number-of-hybrid-fruits case. But in the infinite-number-of-hybrid-
fruits model, we get a clean, determinate result that raises revenue. Recall
that if oranges have the characteristic 100, apples have characteristic 0, and
the tax on oranges is 20%, we can calculate an optimal place, in this case 75,
to divide the line between the taxed and the untaxed.37 Everything above 75
is taxed at 20%, and everything below is not taxed at all. This number is
unique, is not path-dependent, and (under his assumptions, particularly that
we do not care about revenue) maximizes welfare.3S In the debt-equity case,
however, we end up foundering. Why the difference?
Schlunk models the debt-equity distinction linearly by using beta.
39
Like in the hybrid-fruits model, we would calculate some beta, Schlunk
throws out 0.3, that would divide debt from equity. But along come swaps to
ruin the picture. Where do they fit on the line? Basically, they don't. Recall
that the optimal beta was calculated assuming full hybridization. All
products were assumed to exist. So why is the beta we calculated no longer
optimal? Adding swaps is like adding a new commodity that is very much
like equity but not taxed as equity. It is, in the fruit world, as if a new type of
orange, say orange flavoring, with characteristic 101, were suddenly invented
and is taxed like apples at a zero rate. Immediately, all tax disappears. This
is why we end up with a different result in the debt-equity case than in the
fruit case. In the fruit case, there are no two things that are identical but
taxed differently. This illustrates why the swaps example, unlike the fruit
example, is not about line-drawing problems. The problem is that the new
thing, the orange flavoring, is taxed inconsistently with a perfect substitute,
the orange. It is the "blue tax return" problem.
Another reason why the debt-equity model is not like the fruits model is
that the debt-equity model is all about revenue. The only reason we are
37. Id. at 878.
38. Id. at 877-78.
39. Id. at 888.
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concerned about swaps is that they reduce the revenue raised through the tax
on equity. Nothing else matters. In the fruit model, it is revenue that does
not matter. If we strictly apply the lesson of the fruits model, we would
conclude that there is no deadweight loss from the hybridization we see in
the debt-equity model.
It is worth making one final point about the debt-equity example. The
assumption Schlunk makes of perfect substitutes may only be for purposes of
the example, but it is important to note how uncommon and temporary such a
situation is. The tax law cannot tolerate such a situation and usually adjusts
rapidly when one crops up.
For example, in the real world, the combination of issuing debt and a
swap is not a perfect substitute for issuing equity, at least in any volume.
The bankruptcy risks, liquidity risks, or other risks in the two cases are likely
to be different. For this reason, we see limited substitution of debt for equity.
The same is true with all the other highly problematic lines in the tax law.
Independent contractors are not perfect substitutes for employees. Holding a
security with a hedge is not the same as selling. Imputed income is not the
same as market income. All these items are fairly good substitutes for one
another, but they are not perfect substitutes. This imperfection in substitution
is the reason we collect so much tax every year. Tax planning is very
difficult. Although it is important to recognize the problems that highly
liquid and sophisticated financial markets pose for the tax system, we should
not assume that hypothetical equivalences mean that taxpayers can really
eliminate tax by using simple methods.
C. Conclusions on Hybrids, Arbitrage, and the Debt-Equity Distinction
We can draw several conclusions from the hybrids and debt-equity
discussion. The line-drawing theory depends critically on various items'
being imperfect substitutes. If perfect substitutes are taxed differently,
taxpayers will shift to the lower-taxed item. But this phenomenon is not
new, and it is not about line drawing. If items are good but not perfect
substitutes, the deadweight loss from taxing them differently may be very
high. The pressure to conform the treatment should also be correspondingly
high. But if the imperfect substitutes absolutely must be taxed differently,
the line-drawing theory tells us how best to do so.
IV. Conclusion
I find myself confficted when reading Schlunk's article. I like his
goal-tax reform is important, and the debt-equity distinction is a glaring
problem with the tax law. In addition, his arguments that line drawing
cannot fix underlying inconsistencies and that financial innovation will put
more and more pressure on these inconsistencies are undoubtedly correct. It
is important to keep these facts in mind. But I believe his particular
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criticisms of optimal line drawing either miss the mark or are so broad that
they apply to all decisionmaking. Rather than revisiting these criticisms, let
me summarize what we can take away from the article.
First, tax reform is important. No line-drawing theory can eliminate the
major inconsistencies or other problems with current law. All the theories
can do is advise policymakers on immediate decisions. That is their goal.
Reform remains important, even with the best line-drawing theories. I think
this is the key claim of Schlunk's article, buried in discussions of path-
dependence.
Second, when drawing lines, policymakers should carefully examine
their constraints. If decision-makers must act in a world that conforms to
Schlunk's assumptions about old decisions' being fixed, they might end up
carefully plotting a path to their doom. If, instead, they examine their
constraints and discover a degree of freedom previously unknown, they can
potentially make much better policy.
Finally, policymakers have to be forward-looking. Even decisions that
can be reversed impose some sunk costs. Option theory, the theory of
decisionmaking when costs will be sunk, is just beginning to make its way
into law, and maybe more attention needs to be paid to the problems it poses.
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